Computer Security 08. Cryptography – Part II

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Block ciphers

- Block ciphers encrypt a <u>block</u> of plaintext at a time and produce ciphertext
- DES & AES are two popular block ciphers
 - DES: 64 bit blocks
 - AES: 128 bit blocks
- Block ciphers are usually iterative ciphers
 - The encryption process is an iteration through several *round* operations



Block cipher rounds

Each round consists of substitutions & permutations



Substitution = **S-box**

- Table lookup
- Converts a small block of input to a block of output
- Changing one bit of input should change approximately ½ of output bits

Permutation

 Scrambles the bits in a prescribed order

Key application per round

- Subkey per round derived from the key
- Can drive behavior of s-boxes
- May be XORed with the output of each round

Feistel cipher

- DES is a type of Feistel cipher, which is a form of a block cipher
- Plaintext block is split in two
 - Round function applied to one half of the block
 - Output of the round function is XORed with other half of the block
 - Halves are swapped
- AES is not a Feistel cipher



AES (Advanced Encryption Standard)

- Block cipher: 128-bit blocks
 - DES used 64-bit blocks
- Successor to DES as a standard encryption algorithm
 - DES: 56-bit key
 - AES: 128, 192, or 256 bit keys

AES (Advanced Encryption Standard)

- Iterative cipher, just like most other block ciphers
 - Each round is a set of substitutions & permutations
- Variable number of rounds
 - DES always used 16 rounds
 - AES:
 - 10 rounds: 128-bit key
 - 12 rounds: 192-bit key
 - 14 rounds: 256-bit key
 - A subkey ("round key") derived from the key is computed for each round
 - DES did this too

Each AES Round

- Step 1: Byte Substitution (s-boxes)
 - Substitute 16 input bytes by looking each one up in a table (S-box)
 - Result is a 4x4 matrix
- Step 2: Shift rows
 - Each row is shifted to the left (wrapping around to the right)
 - 1st row not shifted; 2nd row shifted 1 position to the left;
 3rd row shifted 2 positions; 4th row shifted three positions
- Step 3: Mix columns
 - 4 bytes in each column are transformed
 - This creates a new 4x4 matrix
- Step 4: XOR round key
 - XOR the 128 bits of the round key with the 16 bytes of the matrix in step 3



AES Decryption

Same rounds ... but in reverse order

DES Disadvantages

- DES has been shown to have some weaknesses
 - Key can be recovered using 2⁴⁷ chosen plaintexts or 2⁴³ known plaintexts
 - Note that this is not a practical amount of data to get for a real attack
- Short block size (8 bytes = $2^8 = 64$ bits)
- The real weakness of DES is its 56-bit key
 - Exhaustive search requires 2⁵⁵ iterations on average
- 3DES solves the key size problem: we can have keys up to 168 bits.
 - Differential & linear cryptanalysis is not effective here: the three layers of encryption use 48 rounds instead of 16 making it infeasible to reconstruct s-box activity.
- DES is relatively slow
 - It was designed with hardware encryption in mind: 3DES is 3x slower than DES
 - Still much faster than RSA public key cryptosystems!

AES Advantages

- Larger block size: 128 bits vs 64 bits
- Larger & varying key sizes: 128, 192, and 256 bits
 - 128 bits is complex enough to prevent brute-force searches
- No significant academic attacks beyond brute force search
 - Resistant against linear cryptanalysis thanks to bigger S-boxes
 - S-box = lookup table that adds non-linearity to a set of bits via transposition & flipping
 - DES: 6-bit inputs & 4-bit outputs
 - AES: 8-bit inputs & 8-bit outputs
- Typically 5-10x faster in software than 3DES

Attacks against AES

- Attacks have been found
 - This does *not* mean that AES is insecure!
- Because of the attacks:
 - AES-128 has computational complexity of 2^{126.1} (~126 bits)
 - AES-192 has computational complexity of 2^{189.7} (~189 bits)
 - AES-256 has computational complexity of 2^{254.9} (~254 bits)
- The security of AES can be increased by increasing the number of rounds in the algorithm
- However, AES-128 still has a sufficient safety margin to make exhaustive search attacks impractical

Cryptographic attacks

- Chosen plaintext
 - Attacker can create plaintext and see the corresponding ciphertext
- Known plaintext
 - Attacker has access to both plaintext & ciphertext but doesn't get to choose the text
- Ciphertext-only
 - The attacker only sees ciphertext
 - Popular in movies but rarely practical in real life

Differential Cryptanalysis

Examine how changes in input affect changes in output

- Discover where a cipher exhibits non-random behavior
 - These properties can be used to extract the secret key
 - Applied to block ciphers, stream ciphers, and hash functions (functions that flip & move bits vs. mathematical operations)
- Chosen plaintext attack is normally used
 - Attacker must be able to choose the plaintext and see the corresponding cipher text

Differential Cryptanalysis

- Provide plaintext with known differences
 - See how those differences appear in the ciphertext
- The properties depend on the key and the s-boxes in the algorithm
- Do this with lots and lots of known *plaintext-ciphertext* sets
- Statistical differences, if found, may allow a key to be recovered faster than with a brute-force search
 - You may deduce that certain keys are not worth trying

Linear Cryptanalysis

Create a predictive approximation of inputs to outputs

- Instead of looking for differences, linear cryptanalysis attempts to come up with a linear formula (e.g., a bunch of xor operations) that connects certain input bits, output bits, and key bits with a probability higher than random
 - Goal is to approximate the behavior of s-boxes
- It will *not* recreate the working of the cipher
 - You just hope to find non-random behavior that gives you insight on what bits of the key might matter
- Works better than differential cryptanalysis for known plaintext
 Differential cryptanalysis works best with chosen plaintext
- Linear & differential cryptanalysis will rarely recover a key but may be able to reduce the number of keys that need to be searched.

Not a good idea to use block ciphers directly

- Streams of data are broken into *k*-byte blocks
 - Each block encrypted separately
 - This is called Electronic Codebook (ECB)
- Problems
 - 1. Same plaintext results in identical encrypted blocks Enemy can build up a code book of plaintext/ciphertext matches
 - 2. Attacker can add/delete/replace blocks



Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode

- Random initialization vector (IV) = bunch of k random bits
 - Non-secret: both parties need to know this
- Exclusive-or with first plaintext block then encrypt the block
- Take exclusive-or of the result with the next plaintext block

 $c_i = E_K(m) \oplus c_{i-1}$



CBC Observations

- Identical blocks of plaintext do not produce the same ciphertext
- Each block is a function of all previous blocks
- But an attacker can still cause data corruption

Block encryption: Counter (CTR) mode

- Random starting counter = bunch of k random bits, just like IV
 - Any function producing a non-repeating sequence (an incrementing number is a common function)
- Encrypt the counter with the key
- Exclusive-or result with plaintext block



Popular symmetric algorithms

- AES (Advanced Encryption Standard)
 - FIPS standard since 2002
 - 128, 192, or 256-bit keys; operates on 128-bit blocks
- DES, 3DES
 - FIPS standard since 1976
 - 56-bit key; operates on 64-bit (8-byte) blocks
 - Triple DES recommended since 1999 (112 or 168 bits)
- Blowfish
 - Key length from 23-448 bits; 64-bit blocks
- IDEA
 - 128-bit keys; operates on 64-bit blocks
 - More secure than DES but faster algorithms are available

Communicating with symmetric cryptography

- Both parties must agree on a secret key, K
- Message is encrypted, sent, decrypted at other side



- Key distribution must be secret
 - otherwise messages can be decrypted
 - users can be impersonated

Key Distribution

Key explosion

Each pair of users needs a separate key for secure communication



Key distribution

Secure key distribution is the biggest problem with symmetric cryptography

Public-key algorithm

• Two related keys.

$$C = E_{K1}(P) \quad P = D_{K2}(C) \qquad K_1 \text{ is a public key} \\ C' = E_{K2}(P) \quad P = D_{K1}(C') \qquad K_2 \text{ is a private key} \end{cases}$$

• Examples:

- RSA, Elliptic curve algorithms,
 DSS (digital signature standard)
- Key length
 - Unlike symmetric cryptography, not every number is a valid key
 - 3072-bit RSA = 256-bit elliptic curve = 128-bit symmetric cipher
 - 15360-bit RSA = 521-bit elliptic curve = 256-bit symmetric cipher

RSA Public Key Cryptography

- Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir, Leonard Adleman created a true public key encryption algorithm in 1977
- Each user generates two keys:
 - Private key (kept secret)
 - Public key (can be shared with anyone)
- Difficulty of algorithm based on the difficulty of factoring large numbers
 - keys are functions of a pair of large (~300 digits) prime numbers

RSA algorithm

How to generate keys

- choose two random large prime numbers *p*, *q*
- Compute the product n = pq
- randomly choose the encryption key, e, such that: e and (p - 1)(q - 1) are relatively prime
- Compute a decryption key, *d* such that: $ed = 1 \mod ((p - 1) (q - 1))$ $d = e^{-1} \mod ((p - 1) (q - 1))$

- discard p, q

The security of the algorithm rests on our understanding that factoring *n* is extremely difficult

RSA Encryption

- What you need:
 - Key pair: e, d
 - Agreed-upon modulus: n
- Encrypt:
 - divide data into numerical blocks < n</p>
 - encrypt each block:

 $c = m^{e} \mod n$

• Decrypt: $m = c^d \mod n$

Communication with public key algorithms

Different keys for encrypting and decrypting

No need to worry about key distribution

Communication with public key algorithms



RSA isn't good for large-scale encryption

Calculations are very expensive (& key generation is slow)

Common speeds:

Algorithm	Bytes/sec
AES-128-ECB	148,000,000
AES-128-CBC	153,000,000
AES-256-ECB	114,240,000
RSA-2048 encrypt	3,800,000
RSA-2048 decrypt	96,000

- AES ~1500x faster to decrypt; 40x faster to encrypt
- RSA is also subject to mathematical attacks
 - Certain keys (numbers) may expose weaknesses
- If anyone learns your private key, they can read all your messages

Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange

Key distribution algorithm

- Allows two parties to exchange keys securely
- Not public key encryption
- Based on difficulty of computing discrete logarithms in a finite field compared with ease of calculating exponentiation

Allows us to negotiate a secret **common key** without fear of eavesdroppers

Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange

- All arithmetic performed in a field of integers modulo some large number
- Both parties agree on
 - a large prime number p
 - and a number $\alpha < p$
- Each party generates a public/private key pair

<u>Private</u> key for user *i*: X_i

<u>Public</u> key for user *i*: $Y_i = \alpha^{X_i} \mod p$

Diffie-Hellman exponential key exchange

- Alice has secret key X_A
- Alice sends Bob public key Y_A
- Alice computes

$$K = Y_B^{X_A} \mod p$$

- Bob has secret key X_B
- Bob sends Alice public key Y_B

K = (Bob's public key) (Alice's private key) mod p

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• expanding:

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= $(\alpha^{X_B} \mod p)^{X_A} \mod p$
= $\alpha^{X_B X_A} \mod p$

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• expanding:

$$K = Y_B^{X_B} \mod p$$

= $(\alpha^{X_A} \mod p)^{X_B} \mod p$
= $\alpha^{X_A X_B} \mod p$

K is a <u>common key</u>, known only to Bob and Alice

K = K'

Hybrid Cryptosystems

- Session key: randomly-generated key for one communication session
- Use a public key algorithm to send the session key
- Use a symmetric algorithm to encrypt data with the session key

Public key algorithms are almost never used to encrypt messages

- Vulnerable to chosen plaintext attacks
- MUCH slower; RSA-2048 approximately 40x slower to encrypt and 1,500x slower to decrypt than AES-256



Now Bob knows the secret session key, K





Forward Secrecy

Suppose an attacker steals Bob's private key

- Future messages can be compromised
- But past messages that used the key can also be decrypted

Pick a session key Encrypt it with the Bob's public key → Bob decrypts the session key

Security rests entirely on the secrecy of Bob's private key

If Bob's private key is compromised, all recorded past traffic can be decrypted

Forward Secrecy

- Forward secrecy
 - Compromise of long term keys does not compromise past session keys
 - There is no one secret to steal that will compromise multiple messages

• Diffie-Hellman

- Use common key as the encryption/decryption key
 - Or as a key to encrypt a session key
- Not recoverable as long as long as private keys are thrown away after each session
- Unlike RSA keys, Diffie Hellman makes key generation simple
- Keys must be ephemeral
 - Client & server will generate new Diffie-Hellman parameters for each session all will be thrown away after the session

Diffie-Hellman is preferred over RSA for key exchange to achieve forward secrecy – generating Diffie-Hellman keys is a rapid, low-overhead process

Cryptographic systems: summary

Symmetric ciphers

- Based on "SP networks" = substitution & permutation sequences
- Asymmetric ciphers public key cryptosystems
 - Based on trapdoor functions
 Easy to compute in one direction; difficult to compute in the other direction without special information (the trapdoor)

Hybrid cryptosystem

- Pick a random session key
- Use a public key algorithm to send
- Use a symmetric key algorithm to encrypt traffic back & forth
- Key exchange algorithms (more to come later)
 - Diffie Hellman
 - Public key

Enables secure communication

without knowledge of a shared secret

RSA cryptography in the future

- Based on the difficulty of factoring products of two large primes
- Factoring algorithms get more efficient as numbers get larger
 - As the ability to decrypt numbers increases, the key size must therefore grow even faster
 - This is not sustainable (especially for embedded devices)

Elliptic Curve Cryptography

• Alternate approach: elliptic curves

 $y^2 = x^3 + ax + b$

- Using discrete numbers, pick
 - A prime number as a maximum (modulus)
 - A curve equation
 - A public base point on the curve
 - A random private key
 - Public key is derived from the private key, the base point, and the curve
- To compute the private key from the public,
 - We need an elliptic curve discrete logarithm function
 - This is difficult and is the basis for ECC's security



Catalog of elliptic curves https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elliptic_curve

ECC vs. RSA

- RSA is still the most widely used public key cryptosystem
 - Mostly due to inertia & widespread implementations
 - Simpler implementation & faster decryption
- ECC offers higher security with fewer bits than RSA
 - ECC is also faster (for key generation & encryption) and uses less memory
 - NIST defines 15 standard curves for ECC
 - Many implementations support only a couple (P-256, P-384)

• For long-term security

The European Union Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA) and the National Institute for Science & Technology (NIST) recommend:

- AES: 256 bit keys
- RSA: 15,360 bit keys
- ECC: 512 bit keys

https://www.keylength.com/en/4/

http://https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/algorithms-key-size-and-parameters-report-2014

Quantum Computers

- Once (if) real quantum computers can be built, they can
 - Crack a symmetric cipher in time proportional to the square root of the key space size: 2^{n/2}
 - Use 256-bit AES to be safe
 - Factor efficiently
 - RSA and many elliptic curve algorithms will not be secure anymore

 NSA called for a migration to "post-quantum cryptographic algorithms" – but no agreement yet on what they are

The End