

## Computer Security

08r. Assignment 7 review  
Pre-exam 2 review – the major concepts

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Spring 2019

March 27, 2019

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## Assignment 7 Review

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### Question 1

What is a necessary condition for perfect secrecy?

Claude Shannon proved that a cipher has perfect secrecy **if and only if there are as many possible keys as possible plaintexts**, so every key is equally likely.

This means the key has to be random and as long as the message ... which means that this is not practical for most real-world use cases

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### Question 2

How did Robert Hooke use a one-way function in 1678?

He published an anagram of a message and revealed it two years later. This allowed him to establish priority for his idea (Hooke's Law for a spring) without disclosing it at the time.

**Discussion:**

This is a precursor to the idea of using a hash.

If I publish a hash of a message,  $H(M)$

And later show you the message,  $M$ , you know that I *must have had the message in order to generate the hash* – a good cryptographic hash function will make it difficult to generate a message that hashes to a specific, desired value

Note that "difficult" = "not feasible" = "impossible for all practical purposes"

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### Question 3

What are the three properties of hash functions listed in the text?

1. They are **one-way functions**
  - Given  $x$ , it is easy to compute  $h(x)$   
but difficult to find  $x$  when given  $h(x)$
2. The function **does not give any information** about any part of the input.
3. It is hard to find collisions
  - A collision is when you can find two messages  $M_1, M_2$  where  $M_1 \neq M_2$  but  $h(M_1) = h(M_2)$

See section 5.3.1 (Random Functions – Hash Functions), 5.3.1.1 (Properties)  
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### Question 4

What does an s-box do in a symmetric block cipher?

- It is a substitution box – it substitutes one bit pattern with another
- Think of it as a lookup table

See section 5.4.1, SP Networks, p. 149

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### Question 4 – discussion

From the text:  
 "The earliest block ciphers were simple networks which combined substitution and permutation circuits, and so were called SP-networks. Figure 5.10 shows an SP-network with sixteen inputs, which we can imagine as the bits of a sixteen-bit number, and two layers of four-bit invertible substitution boxes (or *S-boxes*), each of which can be visualized as a lookup table containing some permutation of the numbers 0 to 15."

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### Question 4 – discussion

Popular symmetric ciphers (e.g., AES and DES) are

- **Block ciphers**
  - They encrypt a chunk of data, then do the next chunk, ...
- **Use an SP network: a combination of substitutions & permutations**
  - This adds confusion & diffusion
    - **Confusion** = every bit of ciphertext depends on various bits of the key. You cannot find a connection between a bit of the key and a bit of the ciphertext.
    - **Diffusion** = if you change a bit in the plaintext, approximately half of the bits in the ciphertext will change.
- **Iterate over multiple rounds**
  - One or a few iterations through s-boxes will not add enough confusion & diffusion to the output.
  - Modern symmetric ciphers use many more rounds (iterations)

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## Topics you should know for the exam

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This is not a review of everything we covered in the past 4 lectures but a listing of some of the major concepts you should know

*You should be familiar with these topics*

If you are not, this this an indication of areas you need to focus on in preparing for the exam

We will not review everything from four lectures in 50 minutes!

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## Application Sandboxing

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### Application sandboxing vs. full sandboxing

- **Full sandboxing** (e.g., containers)
  - Create an isolated environment for an application or group of related programs
  - Almost always: isolated file system namespace
  - Try to simulate a virtual machine – isolate a service (program)
- **Application sandboxing**
  - Restrict operations that an application can perform
  - Not just if it's root
  - Example: deny access to the network or to specific files

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## Forms of application sandboxing

- **System call interposition with user-level validation**
  - System call hooks in the kernel but decisions made by a user process (example: Janus sandbox)
- **Full OS sandboxing**
  - The OS has native support for sandboxing
  - Policies are compiled & pushed into the kernel
  - Examples: Linux Seccomp-BPF, Apple sandbox
- **Browser-based native applications**
  - Example: Chrome NaCL (Native Client)
  - Compile code with special libraries that perform validation of system requests
- **Java sandbox** (process virtual machine)
  - Runtime environment gets all requests & validates them

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## Malware

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## Worms & Viruses

- **Worm**
  - Standalone software
- **Virus**
  - Requires a host program: a virus attaches itself to another piece of software
- **Components**
  - **Infection mechanism**: how does it spread?
  - **Payload**: what does the malware do?
  - **Trigger** (logic bomb): when will the payload run?

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## Some places where malware resides (1)

- **File infector**
  - Virus is part of an executable program
- **Bootloader**
  - Boot process invokes the malware
- **Flash drive**
  - Malicious software on the drive
  - or modified malicious firmware makes the drive send commands
  - or lost drive causes allows data to be stolen by someone else
- **Macros**
  - Office documents, editor files, PDF files
- **Trojan horse**
  - Useful program but also has a **covert purpose**

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## Some places where malware resides (2)

- **Backdoors**
  - Program with some undocumented mechanism to allow a user to log in or execute commands
- **Rootkit**
  - Modify the operating system, libraries, and/or commands to hide the presence of malware

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## Social engineering

- **#1 way of getting malware onto a system**
- **Get users to do something that isn't in their best interest**
- **Examples:**
  - Phishing: email masqueraded to come from someone you trust with links or attachments you're asked to click on
  - Spear phishing: personalized phishing
  - Deceptive web sites: web sites that masquerade as legitimate companies or services
    - Phishing requests often take you there
    - Goal: steal login credentials
  - Deceptive content on web sites
    - Ads on file sharing sites often look like download links

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## Defenses

1. Signature-based scanning
  - Accurate but requires knowledge of sample bytes of the malware
2. Behavior-based monitoring
  - Difficult to detect what is an anomaly but works on new malware

### Countermeasures

- Use a packer to obscure the payload when it's in the file system
- Polymorphic viruses
  - Modify the code each time the virus propagates
- Social engineering: ask a user to override permissions

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## Cryptographic Systems

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## Ciphers

- **Symmetric**
  - Same key for encryption & decryption
- **Asymmetric (public key)**
  - Two related keys: encrypt with one, decrypt with the other
  - Based on **trapdoor functions**
- Kerckhoffs's Principle – use publicly known algorithms

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## Classic cipher types

- **Monoalphabetic substitution cipher**
  - Replace one character (bit pattern) with another
  - **Caesar cipher**: the substitution alphabet is the alphabet shifted by  $n$  positions
  - Vulnerable to **frequency analysis**: certain letters are more likely than others
- **Polyalphabetic substitution cipher**
  - Change the substitution alphabet based on the position of the character
  - Still vulnerable to frequency analysis but more difficult
- **One-time pad**
  - Key = long set of random characters
  - Each key character encrypts one plaintext character
  - Problem
    - Key must be (1) truly random, (2) as long as the message, (3) never reused
- **Transposition cipher**
  - Scramble the data instead of substituting it

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## Ciphers

- **What is perfect secrecy?**
  - Ciphertext contains no information about the plaintext
- **Stream cipher**
  - Approximation of a one time pad
  - Instead of a random stream of bits for the long key, create the stream using a **pseudorandom number generator**
- **Block ciphers**
  - Encrypt a chunk of data at a time
  - Most ciphers we use are block ciphers – usually based on key size
    - Symmetric ciphers: AES (32- or 64-byte blocks), DES (8-byte blocks)
    - Public key ciphers:
      - RSA (typically 8- or 16-byte blocks)
      - ECC (typically 28-, 32-, or 64-byte blocks)

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## Using block ciphers

- **Electronic code book (ECB)**
  - Each block of plaintext is encrypted individually
- Problem
  - Common parts of plaintext will produce identical ciphertext
- Solution
  - **Counter mode**
    - An incrementing count is encrypted with the key for each block
    - Result is XORed with the block of plaintext to create ciphertext
  - **Cipher block chaining (CBC) mode**
    - Encryption of each block is a function of the previous blocks

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## Secure communication

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## Secure communication

- **Symmetric cryptography**
  - Encrypt and decrypt with a shared secret key
- **Public key cryptography**
  - Encrypt with the destination's public key
  - They decrypt with their private key
- **Hybrid cryptography**
  - Public key cryptography is *really slow* ... and generating keys takes time
    - Use public key cryptography to send a random *session key*
    - Then communicate with symmetric cryptography

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## Key Exchange

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## Key exchange

- **Diffie-Hellman** key exchange
  - Not an encryption algorithm: only key exchange
  - **Forward secrecy**
    - Means that even if you steal someone's private key, you cannot decipher their past communications
    - Requires single-use (*ephemeral*) keys
- **Needham-Schroeder** algorithm – use a trusted 3<sup>rd</sup> party to send a session key
  - **Denning-Sacco protocol**: add *timestamps*
  - **Otway-Rees protocol**: Use a *random session ID* for each message
- **Kerberos**
  - Authentication, authorization, & key exchange
  - Essentially the Denning-Sacco protocol

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## Integrity

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## Integrity

- **Hash function** = strong checksum
- **Hash pointer** = pointer and hash(data pointed to)
  - Blockchain = linked list
  - Merkle tree = binary tree
- **MAC** = Message Authentication Code
  - Encrypted hash – shared key
  - Forms: HMAC, CBC-MAC
- **Digital signature**
  - Encrypted hash – using public key cryptography
- **Digital certificates**
  - { name, public key } signed by the issuer (Certification Authority)

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